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ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENTS' GOVERNING LEGISLATION DOES NOT PREVENT THEIR 
CALCULATING CLAIMANT'S BENEFITS BASED UPON HIS MOST RECENT 
EARNINGS 
In their brief Respondents argue that no matter how 
simple and inexpensive the process of calculating Claimant's 
benefits based upon his most recent earnings, they cannot do 
this because their governing legislation has been, in 
essence, "set in stone." They argue that the legislation 
prohibits them from calculating Claimant's benefit amount 
based upon his most recent earnings until his current benefit 
year expires. 
However, nowhere in the statute is there a direct 
prohibition against Respondents calculating Claimant's 
current benefit amount based upon his most recent earnings. 
Furthermore, as a governmental agency implementing 
legislation, Respondents have the duty to implement not only 
the letter of the law--but more importantly the "spirit of 
the law." The spirit of the law is to allow those persons 
who are unemployed through no fault of their own, benefits to 
protect them from the harsh results of unemployment. The 
spirit of the law is also to maintain Claimant's purchasing 
power at its most recent level. See e.g. Utah Code Ann. §35-
4-2, Utah Department of Employment Security Rules and 
Regulations, Rule A71-07-l:2 (Attached as exhibit 1). 
Respondents cite Utah Code Ann. §35-4-22(d)(1). 
All section 35-4-22(d)(1) states is that a benefit year is 
established for 52 weeks beginning at the time an individual 
"files'* for benefits. Claimant filed for benefits in August 
of 1985 after being laid off from employment he began in 
April of 1985. In as much as they are not specifically 
prohibited from basing benefits upon Claimant's most recent 
earnings, in as much as calculating Claimant's benefits based 
on his most recent earnings would uphold the spirit of the 
law, and in as much as it is a "relatively easy" thing to do 
(Respondents brief at 24), they should do it. 
II. RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT SHOWN ANY BURDEN WHATSOEVER IN 
CALCULATING CLAIMANT'S BENEFITS BASED UPON HIS MOST RECENT 
EARNINGS 
Respondents also argue that they would have to 
acquire new wage data and develop new wage computations if 
they were to recalculate Claimant's benefits based upon his 
most recent earnings. However, they do not state what new 
data would be required in addition to that already reported 
on a quarterly basis by employers. They do not state how 
calculating benefits based upon a Claimant's most recent 
earnings is any different for someone who happens to have 
received benefits within the last 52 weeks as opposed to 
someone who has never received benefits before or who 
received benefits more than 52 weeks previously. 
As Respondents cite in their brief, the Court in 
In Re Jullin, 158 P.2d 319 (Wash. 1945) stated: "As to the 
matter of additional work and expense on the part of the 
division in Nreprocessing' claims, that is at least a 
debatable question." Id. at 327. However, "the question here 
is not merely one of possibLe delay, duplication of work, and 
expense, but whether the act has indeed been administered 
justly and fairly to all concerned in the proper distribution 
of a trust fund." Id., at 327. 
In their brief Respondents state: "Any earnings of 
the claimant in the current benefit year are used in a new 
base period when a new benefit year is established." 
(Respondents brief at 23.) One can only wonder why Claimant, 
who desperately needs unemployment benefits immediately, has 
to wait months for the arbitrary 52 week current benefit year 
to expire, with little or no benefit award because of his 
initial base period earnings, and then be eligible to receive 
the exact same benefits based upon the exact calculations he 
is asking Respondents to make now. Whatever the "relatively 
easy" recalculations Respondents might be required to make, 
it is unjust to allow Claimant only $43.00 worth of benefits 
for five weeks, or a total of $215.00 at a time when he has 
just completed employment with substantial earnings and 
desperately needs the benefits specifically designated by the 
legislature to help him survive the harsh results of 
unemployment and to maintain his most recent purchasing 
power. 
III. THE STATUTORY SCHEME IS TO PREVENT SUCCESSIVE CLAIMS 
BEING FILED WITH NO NEW EMPLOYMENT TO SUPPORT A NEW CLAIM 
From the case law cited by Respondents it seems 
that the main purpose of the "base period-benefit year" 
scheme is to prevent successive claims being filed with no 
new employment to support a new claim. 
In Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. 
Anaconda Aluminum Co., 433 S.W.2d 119 (Ky. 1968) the sole 
issue was whether or not a second 26 weeks of benefits would 
be allowed following the exhaustion of the first 26 weeks 
where there was no intervening work. This case has no 
relation whatsoever to Claimant's case. Claimant is asking 
for his current benefits to be based upon calculations from 
his most recent and substantial employment which occurred 
between the time he last received benefits in April of 1985 
and the time he was laid off from work in August of 1985. 
In Kalin v. Oliver Iron Min. Co., 37 N.W.2d 365 
(Minn. 1949) an employee, who was shortly to retire, applied 
for benefits while he was still employed. By setting his 
benefit year early, before actually retiring, he was 
attempting to get two years of benefits without any 
intervening employment. Claimant, of course, did not file 
for benefits while working and had intervening employment 
between the last time he received benefits and his present 
application. 
IV. THE CASES CITED BY RESPONDENTS DO NOT SUPPORT THEIR 
REFUSAL TO BASE CLAIMANT'S BENEFITS ON HIS MOST RECENT 
EARNINGS 
Respondents cite Berkoff v. Hasegawa, 514 P.2d 575 
(Hawaii 1973), In re Jullin, 158 P.2d 319 (Wash. 1945), and 
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Anaconda 
Aluminum Co., 433 S.W. 2d 119 (Ky. 1968) for the proposition 
that once a benefit year and amount are set they cannot be 
changed. As Respondents admit, none of these cases decided 
the issue for which they are being cited. They each dealt 
with invalid prior claims. Not one of these cases holds that 
a present benefit amount may not be based upon intervening 
work following an initial claim filed within the last 52 
weeks• 
v
- THE CASES CITED BY RESPONDENTS HAVE HELD THAT THERE IS A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST IN UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
Gray v. Department of Employment Security, 681 P.2d 
807 (Utah 1984), is cited by Respondents for the proposition 
that there cannot be a due process violation without a state 
action involving a constitutionally protected liberty or 
property interest. Respondents further argue that 
unemployment benefits are neither a constitutionally 
protected liberty nor property interest. However, this Court 
specifically held in Gray that unemployment compensation 
benefits are a constitutionally protected property interest. 
Id., at 817. This Court in Gray also quotes 42 U.S.C. 
§503(a)(l) stating that the law's administration should be 
"reasonably calculated to insure full payment" of benefits 
when due. To reasonably calculate Claimant's benefits to 
insure full payment due him, Respondents must calculate 
Claimant's benefits based upon his most recent earnings. 
VI. RESPONDENTS ' INTERPRETATION OF THE GOVERNING STATUTE 
RESULTS IN AN INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND HAS NO RATIONAL 
RELATION TO ANY LEGITIMATE LEGISLATIVE GOAL 
Respondents argue that neither an invidious 
discrimination nor an irrational relation to a legitimate 
legislative goal result from their refusal to recalculate 
Claimant's benefits. Discrimination between Claimant and 
other identically situated employees was discussed in 
Claimant's initial brief. In as much as unemployment 
compensation benefits are a constitutionally protected 
property interest, this discrimination is invidious. The 
fact that Respondents have shown no burden whatsoever in 
basing Claimant's benefit amount on his most recent earning 
history means that there is no rational relationship between 
their interpretation of the governing statute and legitimate 
state interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents are arguing that their hands are tied 
by their governing legislation, that to grant Claimant his 
benefits is too burdensome, and that they are not 
discriminating against him in a manner that violates 
Claimant's due process or equal protection rights. 
However, the statute does not preclude an award of 
benefits based upon Claimant's most recent earnings. 
Respondents have shown no burden whatsoever that would result 
from calculating Claimant's benefits based upon his most 
recent earnings. In fact, they will make the necessary 
calculations anyway after the arbitrary 52 week benefit year 
that Claimant is currently in expires. Claimant of course 
needs the benefits now, not months from now. 
In as much as there is no burden on Respondents to 
calculate Claimant's benefits based upon his most recent 
earnings Respondents have failed to show a rational relation 
to any legitimate legislative need. Claimant has a 
constitutionally protected interest in receiving unemployment 
compensation benefits. Where benefits for identically 
situated co-workers would be based upon their most recent 
earnings, there is obvious invidious discrimination. 
Respondents have failed to show that their refusal to 
calculate Claimant 's benefits based on his most recent 
earnings has a rational relation to any legitimate 
legislative goal. 
Claimant asks this court to reverse Respondents' 
decision below and to order that Respondents calculate 
unemployment compensation benefits for Claimant based upon a 
base period that includes his April to August, 1985, 
earnings. 
Dated this X T day of (^VAJ,, , 1986. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
CLAIMANT/PETITIONER 
By: Waine Riches 
ADDENDUM 
Utah Department of Employment Security, 
Rules and Regulations, Rule A71-07-l:2 Exhibit 1 
A71-07-l:2 DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY — RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Section 35-4-2: As a guide to the interpretation and 
application of this act, the public policy of this state 
is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to 
unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, 
and welfare of the people of this state. Unemployment 
is therefore a subject of general interest and concern 
which requires appropriate action by the Legislature 
to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which 
now so often falls with crushing force upon the the 
unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of 
social security requires protection against this great-
est hazard of our economic life. . . 
A. PREAMBLE 
1. One of the purposes of the Employment Security Act is to lighten the 
burdens of persons unemployed through no fault of their own by maintaining their 
purchasing power in the economy. The legislature, in establishing this program 
recognized the substantial social ills associated with unemployment and sought 
to ameliorate these problems with a program to pay workers for a limited time 
while they seek other employment. It is because of these reasons that it is in 
the public interest to liberally construe and administer the Act. It is impor-
tant that both the worker seeking benefits and the employer who will ultimately 
pay for such benefits understand the process by which contributions are assessed 
and benefits are paid. The following Rules are written to explain and clarify 
the application of the Act. In applying these Rules to individual cases, the 
Department will consider the reasonableness of claimants action, the totality 
of the employment situation and whether the claimant has a genuine continuing 
attachment to the labor market. 
2. The Utah Department of Employment Security has an obligation to be 
unbiased in administration of the Act. Therefore, the Department must allow all 
parties due process before dispensing the revenues provided by the Employment 
Security Act in order to protect the investment of employers who contribute to 
the unemployment insurance fund, the interests of the unemployed worker who 
may be eligible for the dollars provided by the fund and the community which 
benefits from a stable workforce through the maintance of purchasing power. Due 
process requires that employers will not be charged contributions for benefits 
and workers will not be denied benefits without the opportunity to provide 
information, and contest or refute the information considered in the decision 
making process. 
3. When an eligible worker has no work available there exists no controversy 
between the worker, the employer, or the Department and benefits must be paid 
promptly if all the provisions of the Act are met. However, when a worker quits, 
is fired or has any other issue under the law, an investigation of the circum-
stances must take place to determine if benefits can be paid. In determining 
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whether or not the worker is eligible for benefits, his actions are measured 
against the standards of just cause following a discharge and good cause and 
equity and good conscience following a voluntary separation from employment. 
When one party fails to provide information or when that information is less 
credible, the result is that the party who has the responsibility to provide 
information may not prevail in its position. 
B. EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS 
The evidentiary requirement for Department decisions is a preponderance of the 
evidence. It is not necessary to meet criminal court standards of beyond reason-
able doubt or overwhelming evidence. Preponderance means evidence which is of 
greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition 
to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved 
is more probable than not. Although the evidence that is required for an appeal 
decision must be of probative value, an initial determination may be made based 
on the best or most logical information available. Sworn testimony or first-hand 
statements have greater believability than unsworn statements or hearsay. A 
great deal of information is provided to the Department through telephone conver-
sations and written reports. While the information provided in this manner will 
always be considered by the Department, it cannot be relied upon more than credible 
sworn testimony when the parties have been given an opportunity to present evidence 
in person. Hearsay, which is information provided by a source whose credibility 
cannot be tested through cross-examination, has inherent infirmaties which make 
it unreliable. The failure of one party to provide information either initially 
or at the appeals hearing severely limits the amount and quality of the informa-
tion upon which to base a good decision. Therefore, it is necessary for all 
parties to actively participate in the deicison making process by providing 
accurate and complete information in a timely manner to assure the protection of 
the interests of each party and preserve the social integrity of the unemployment 
insurance system. 
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